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Abstract
Millions of people are finding their livelihoods and security threatened as the effects of climate change
intensify around the world. Migration as a response to the continuing ecological crisis is often the only
pathway to safety. However, the future of such migrants is uncertain given the lack of mechanisms and
systems to provide legal inclusion for displaced populations. In this paper, I challenge the existing
international frameworks and point out the inadequacies in protecting victims of climate migration. To
address these shortcomings, I suggest a new framework consisting of three features: systematic use of
technology and data to determine populations in need of protection, the development of a system of
bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the logistical and financial support of supranational institutions. I
discuss the importance of framing in a world of increasingly militarized borders and anti-immigrant
sentiment and advocate for climate change migration to be framed as disaster relief for the sake of political
viability.

Note
This project is a continuation of my independent study project through the School for International Training
program in Geneva, Switzerland titled “The Impacts of Warming Coffee: The Climate Change-CoffeeMigration Nexus in the Northern Triangle of Central America”, in which climate change migration is
illustrated by exploring the effects of climate change on coffee growing communities in Central America.
This thesis project acknowledges the many ways in which the environment can pose an existential threat to
humans in the form of sudden ecological disasters and slow-onset effects of climate change and seeks to
create a realistic framework for permanent and well-supported resettlement in the wake of a worsening
environmental crisis.
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Introduction
Although environmentally triggered migration is far from a new phenomenon, the
growing intensity of adverse effects of climate change in recent years has led to a more
urgent need to facilitate the resettlement of the rising numbers of people fleeing climaterelated disasters. Benoit Mayer (2011) explains the two options that emerged for those
affected adversely from climate change. First, in situ adaptation, like mitigating flood
damage by creating floating gardens to prevent further destruction that leads to migration,
or secondly, resettlement. He asserts that there’s a consensus among scientific and NGO
literature that in situ adaptation is not always possible and resettlement becomes an
unquestionable need (pp. 371-373). As more lives are altered by compounding effects of
climate change, displacement due to environmental factors has become a key feature of
the reality of the 21st century and is projected to continue.
By contextualizing the relationship between climate change and migration, the
striking need for a new framework to address the millions of people displaced, or soon to
be displaced, as a result of climate change becomes readily apparent. I have illustrated
this relationship in previous work titled: “The Impacts of Warming Coffee: The Climate
Change-Coffee-Migration Nexus in the Northern Triangle of Central America” in 2019. I
will now review a number of crucial issues revealed in this project that must be taken into
account in order to understand the need for a new legal framework around climate and
human migration.
The first is the interconnectedness of factors that drive migration, and the
difficulty in tracking the specifics of human movement. Undoubtedly, there are

Page | 2

difficulties in understanding the precise impacts of specific drivers of migration, since the
root causes are not easily singled out. There are often numerous factors that contribute to
a decision to leave one’s home. Those who are on the move are not marked with a
wristband that indicates a single reason for migration. Rather, someone crossing a border
in search for employment may be tossed in a category of labor migrant or economic
migrant, without considering the fact that they may also be displaced persons-- suffering
an adverse effect of climate change, which slowly or suddenly destroyed their livelihood.
The search for employment is only part of the story, although it may be the most visible
immediate goal. It becomes obvious once we examine real migratory decisions that the
dualistic understanding of forced displacement versus voluntary migration in law, and in
general discourse, is a false binary.
The second point is the importance of exploring climate change migration through
a regionally focused lens. Climate change certainly does not affect the world
homogeneously, and even within a region there are very significant disparities in how
people’s environments are transformed. It is therefore critical to target studies and
eventually adjust policies to be sensitive to the situations and to the needs of the people in
a specific region, keeping in mind the most vulnerable. For the purposes of this essay, my
focus is Central American emigration. Migration from the three countries in the spotlight- Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador-- is typically characterized as a response to
economic turmoil and gang violence (Lynch, 2019, p. 12). Environmental factors are
seldom associated as a trigger and are regularly overshadowed in public discourse and
literature by alluring stories of violence.
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In this previous work, I illustrate the role of climate change in Central American
out-migration, examining specifically the coffee growing industry. Although Central
America is historically an arid region, recently the frequency and intensity of droughts is
rising which significantly impacts agricultural production, including coffee (p. 15). The
sensitive crop is also severely threatened by rising temperatures and irregular weather
patterns attributed to climate change (p. 17). The rising temperatures also worsen the
spread of Coffee Leaf Rust (CLR), a disease that reduces coffee cherry yields and
devastates coffee growing communities.
This brings us to another major point. Climate change can have devastating
effects on entire communities which either directly leads to migration or exacerbates
other factors that trigger migration. Most coffee farming in Central America is done by
smallholder farmers. For example, 97% of coffee producers in Guatemala are considered
smallholder farmers, with the majority owning on average 1.2 Ha of land (Tay, 2018, pp.
2-3). Therefore, when rust and rising temperatures threaten coffee yield across an area,
many more people are affected than would be in a situation where a drought threatens
large conventional corn farms like those in the United States.
After a 2011 rust epidemic in Central America, roughly 80,000 hectares of land in
Honduras was infected, wiping out half of the harvest for 30,000 farmers and completely
destroying about 10,000 farmers’ harvests (Ward, Gonthier, and Nichols, 2017, p. 1082).
After such farmers’ livelihood is destroyed, they are left with little choice in many cases
but to move from their homes, either within the country, or transnationally. Whether the
loss of agricultural production is seen as the driver itself, or conceptualized as the
amplifier of other phenomena that lead to the exodus of coffee producers, there is an
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undeniable relationship between climate change and the movement of people that is
exemplified by the story of coffee production in Central America.
Lastly, it must be understood that temperatures are continuing to elevate, and
consequently the numbers of people on the move are projected to rise with them. Those
who are displaced from climate change lack international protection and are often
vulnerable to human rights abuses as they navigate a world of increasingly closed and
militarized borders. However, the environment is progressively being recognized as a
driving factor of human movement worthy of projection by international law as well as
individual governments’ laws in response to both sudden and slow-onset disasters
attributed to climate change. The responses to these disasters must not be a one-size fits
all solution, but rather a number of regionally sensitive resettlement arrangements that
take into account the need for protection. By recognizing and responding to the vast
cultural, demographic, and ecological differences between and within different regions,
policies can adequately and accurately safeguard the human rights of the millions of
people who will inevitably be displaced by climate change.

Terminology
Within public discourse around migration in general, it's common to find a variety
of terms used to label people who move such as migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, and
internally displaced person, among others. These technical and legal labels are often
contested and there has been no consensus around an appropriate label for those
displaced from climate change. Those affected by sudden or slow-onset environmental
disasters are not identified under a single conceptual or legal category and would find it
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difficult to seek refugee status given the current framework laid out in the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the 1967 protocol.
In these widely accepted and ratified regulatory frameworks, the term “refugee” is
limited to “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UN General Assembly,
1951, p. 152). Despite this association of refugee status with human persecution, in the
1980s before the phrase “climate change” entered the scene, the term “environmental
refugees” was commonly used by experts in the United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). At this time, these
organizations used “environmental refugee” to refer to people who had been forced out of
where they lived due to an environmental disruption, whether it was considered
temporary or permanent (Faiste and Shade, 2017, p. 5).
Thomas Faiste and Jeannette Shade (2017) track the development of the
terminology and show how an “environmental refugee” became a “climate refugee”
before the use of the term “refugee” for those displaced by ecological factors became
heavily disputed and rejected by the United Nations altogether. By the time the IPCC
came out with its 4th report in 2007, “environmental migration” became the norm (p. 6).
Compared to “refugee,” the term “migrant” is more of an umbrella term and defined by
the IOM as “a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether
within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a
variety of reasons” (IOM, 2019, p. 130). In essence, the terms are often ambiguous and
there has yet to be a global consensus given the complexity of the international
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frameworks and the interconnectedness of the many factors that drive people from their
habitats.
Such ambiguous terminology is rooted in the complexity of migration itself, and
the interacting reasons people end up on the move. There is not simply a clean dichotomy
of voluntary migrants and forced refugees. Benoit Mayer (2011) notes that “climate
migrants should surely be considered closer to political refugees than to ‘ordinary’
migrants” (p. 381), since those fleeing in both cases are trying to escape environments
where survival is questionable and fundamental rights are clearly lacking. In my writing
and for the purposes of this discussion, I intentionally use the term “climate migrant” or
phrases like “those displaced by climate change” in order to be inclusive of all
individuals who are moving as a result of climate change, regardless of what degree of
choice they are perceived to have in the matter. The lack of consensus over definitions
and labels is only the beginning of the intricacies in the world’s response to climate
migrants.

Bridging the protection gaps: who is responsible to
address displacement?
It’s well established in both scholarship and political debates that there is a
fundamental gap in international law and existing legal frameworks when it comes to
addressing those on the move due to climate change. The United Nations General
Assembly, in their 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants recognizes a
significant number of people who left their homes because of climate change and
discusses the reality that those we currently call migrants and refugees actually
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experience common challenges and vulnerabilities (p. 2). Therefore, they call the
movements of these people “global phenomena that call for global approaches and global
solutions”. They follow this up by declaring that “no one state can manage such
movements on its own.” (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 2) This approach has
implications for the discussion of “burden sharing” where it must be recognized that one
state should not have to host an entire community displaced by climate change.
In their 2018 Global Compact on migration, The UN General Assembly
recognizes the necessity to “enhance cooperation on international migration in all its
dimensions” (p. 2). This includes strengthening their mapping abilities to be able to
predict and address movements that resulted from both sudden and slow onset natural
disasters (p. 10). Taking into account adverse effects of climate change, the Global
Compact also discusses the need to integrate displacement considerations into disaster
preparedness strategies between neighboring countries. Such strategies would include
contingency planning, evacuation planning, mechanisms of registering or screening
displaced people and addressing their needs, and so on (p. 10). In the same section the
Compact advocates for developing regional approaches to address vulnerabilities and
provide humanitarian relief. This compact is non-binding, and the authors recognize
national sovereignty when it comes to a state’s right to determine legislative and policy
measures to implement their suggestions. This leaves the question of how to approach the
implementation of these grand ideas. They suggest that implementation requires support
from the global, regional, national, and local levels (p. 3).
In Joseph Caren’s The Ethics of Immigration (2013), he challenges the current
organization of the world and the increasing implementation of strict border control in
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response to the many types of immigration. Rather than creating a specific plan or policy
proposal, Carens’ goal is to “challenge complacency” and to illustrate how current
practices deny basic freedoms and maintain harmful inequality (p. 295). Caren’s specific
focus is on states’ responsibilities to admit and resettle refugees. Although I believe those
displaced from climate change should not legally fall under the current refugee
framework, Carens’ list of duties to admit refugees is inseparably linked to a state's duties
to accept climate migrants.
Carens’ list of reasons that generate a state’s duty to accept refugees include a
causal connection, where the state has a duty to accept refugees since their actions have
led to the destruction of livelihoods. “We should already be starting to think about
environmental refugees,” he wrote in 2013, noting that there are arguments suggesting
that rich democratic states should accept more ‘environmental refugees’ since they are
largely responsible for anthropogenic climate change. Although there may be merit to
this argument, at this point in time this specific causal link is not well developed and, in
fact, not necessary to advocate for a just system of climate migration governance.
Humanitarian concern is Carens’ second reason for a state to accept refugees.
Simply put, “...they have an urgent need for a safe place to live and we are in a good
position to provide it” (p. 195). Safety and security of those migrating is often threatened,
and it is reasonable to call for humanitarian aid to prevent unnecessary insecurity or even
loss of life. Environmental disasters that lead to displacement make resettlement a
humanitarian obligation.
Lastly, Carens argues, on page 196, that being a part of the state system
presupposes a duty to correct the failures of the nation-state system. Humans drew
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boundaries on top of land, and when the land cannot be lived on, for whatever reason,
there must be a safe remedy for one who has fled across a boundary in order for these
lines to remain legitimate. Under the modern nation state, we should recognize that there
will be failures in any social institution that we create. In fact, it is our duty to correct
these failures. Supporting safe and orderly movement of people, particularly by those
affected adversely by climate change between states is possibly the most visible failure
today in the context of the nation state. To address this failure, philosophers like Carens
entreat us to consider our ethical obligations, and legal experts like Benoit Mayer work to
re-imagine the legal mechanisms through which we protect those on the move.
In his 2011 article, Benoit Mayer presents five guiding principles, some of which
he pulls from outside international legal documents, to illustrate what an ideal framework
would look like. Given the fact that climate change migration can be foreseen well in
advance, unlike many cases that result in political asylum claims, he determines that
well-planned and voluntary resettlement should be preferred over emergency disaster
relief (p. 389). In addition to an early response, his second guiding principle is the
necessity to respect individual and collective rights, and Mayer adds that collective
resettlement is important to preserve social structures (p. 393). Taking a global approach
is his third principle, since climate change is clearly a global problem (p. 393). He then
goes on to ask the question: who pays for it? His answer is the application of the principle
of “common but differentiated responsibility that recognizes that climate change is a
global problem, but that countries have different abilities and responsibilities when it
comes to resettling climate migrants” (p. 395). Lastly, he includes the principle of
subsidiarity, which he adapts from the treaty on the European Union, which ensures the
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individual states and communities have agency in assisting their populations in
resettlement, but when they cannot, it becomes the responsibility of the larger
communities to intervene and ensure human rights are accessible (p. 398). Applying this
principle to climate migrant resettlement, if, theoretically bilateral agreements fail,
political leadership from within the region must step in to assist in ensuring a safe
journey to resettlement.
Of course, Mayer's ideal framework is international in nature, given the global
reach of climate change, however, he does raise an important point regarding the
possibility for regional agreements and the communal approach to solving this puzzle
while still acknowledging the diversity in resources of the potential states involved. I
would agree with Mayer in that a new framework ideally should be guided by the idea of
creating well planned voluntary resettlement programs, common but differentiated
responsibility, a recognition of collective rights, and a principle of subsidiarity if nations
are unable to take care of people on the move. Of course, principles vary across regions
and interests shift as new leaders come to power. With this in mind, there are a number of
different ways in which scholars, politicians, and international bodies have envisioned the
appropriate response to millions of people being displaced as a result of climate change.
Below, I describe a potential framework that draws on these principles, with particular
attention to the ways such planning might manifest within the Central/North American
regional system.
In an ideal world: no matter my occupation, location, or situation, if I decide that
the place that I reside is no longer livable, I should have the right to leave such a place
and go somewhere else. The process for doing so should be simple and understandable. If
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my search for a new residence happens to be over the lines drawn by other people, I
should explain my situation to the political entity that claims jurisdiction/sovereignty in
the space, and they should ask if I need help. If I am fleeing a hurricane, this owner
should give me temporary protection until returning to my home is no longer threatening.
If I flee rising sea levels flooding my home and must leave, this landowner should offer
me a permanent pathway to safety where I can participate socially and economically. I
should not have to understand hundreds of dense pages of legal documents and have to
argue my case. In other words, any ideal solution to the problem of environmental
displacement must take as its starting point the fundamental needs of vulnerable people
who must leave their homes and should provide them with practical and manageable
pathways forward.
Indeed, there are precedents in policy and practice for the establishment of such
remedies. Globally, migration due to environmental factors is neither new, nor
completely ignored in regional agreements or international debates, as Vincent Chetail
from the global migration center at the graduate institute of Geneva remarked in an
interview for my previous research (Lynch 25). However, considering the empirical
reality of the current inadequacies in protecting those moving in response to the
environment, it’s time to expedite the application of a more comprehensive new
framework. Rather than a top-down, “one-size fits all” remedy conceived by the United
Nations, a new framework would be more effective if it consists of a system of tailored
agreements that can fit the varying needs of many communities living in diverse regions.
An adequate system designed to protect those displaced by climate change must
contain pathways to safe and orderly resettlement. A war that has created a political
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refugee may end, and the previously unlivable places may find peace; so, the person
displaced could reasonably decide to move back. However, if the ocean has taken your
home as a result of climate change, or you have succumbed to unprecedented effects of
desertification, return may never be possible. It’s important to envision sustainable and
lasting remedies to migration related to climate change disasters, just as we account for
the possibility of political refugees requiring permanent resettlement (even as others are
given an opportunity to repatriate).

Towards a Framework for Climate Migration
In recognizing the design flaws of the current arrangements, the question
becomes: in what direction must we head to ensure the survival and security of millions
of people displaced by climate change? An effective and sufficient system would look
like a collection of flexible bilateral and multilateral agreements between nations. These
agreements could potentially address migration more comprehensively, but at minimum
they should include contingency plans to protect those who are forcibly displaced -either suddenly, or as a result of slow onset ecological disasters. Every region is unique
culturally, historically, and politically. Local complexities make it difficult to establish a
universal standard for how to assist those displaced. Given the difficulty with
implementing one-size fits all legal frameworks into vastly different regions, it would be
far more effective to structure bilateral and multilateral agreements that are more tailored
to fit the specific needs of those on the move and the recipient nations. International
bodies should support these agreements and monitor their effectiveness to ensure that
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millions of people moving will be able to enjoy human rights. The United Nations should
monitor and support, rather than enforce rules in this case.
In this section, I will delineate how we can move towards this type of regionally
responsive framework using the Central/North American region as a case study. I explain
what features a functioning framework will include at a minimum: First, is systematic
data-gathering and data-sharing at the regional level as a way of identifying the
populations at risk for climate-related vulnerability with mechanisms to provide
immediate protection to individuals who need it. A second criteria would be the
development of a system of bilateral and multilateral agreements that are built around
current migration patterns resulting from climate change. These agreements should offer,
at the very least, safe ways to temporarily shelter, with options for permanent
resettlement on a case-by-case basis to allow for orderly responses to anticipated
displacement. Lastly, the logistical and financial support of supranational institutions to
provide firmly established monitoring bodies to track and ensure that regional agreements
are effective. Every step must be taken carefully to mitigate the potential crisis of
thousands of more people leaving their homes and making dangerous journeys to places
that have no clear plan in place to assist them.
When one is displaced because of climate change related factors, they often find
themselves in a legal limbo given the complex nature of migration and slowly-adapting
migration law. Most migrants, and even most displaced people, do not fit the refugee
requirements as defined in the aforementioned 1951 Refugee Convention and subsequent
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, even if the environment they’re leaving
is completely unlivable. In this legal limbo-- forced to move, but with no recognized right
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to migrate-- vulnerability is common and peoples’ rights are threatened or even
completely invisible. Lacking permanent legal status can make one more susceptible to
labor exploitation, for example.
An updated system of migration governance that is people-centered is the remedy
to the intensifying vulnerabilities of those displaced from climate change. In response,
there are three different registers of thinking. The first would be the ethical ideal. Ideally,
there would be an immediate global recognition that climate change is forcibly driving
people from their homes, resulting in thousands of people finding themselves in
vulnerable and dangerous situations. Ideally, the recognition of such an alarming reality
would lead to internationally motivated and well-funded responses to ensure the rights of
those displaced are protected. Of course, in a world where borders are militarized and
anti-immigrant sentiments are high, there needs to be a more politically viable solution.
This thinking is in a more pragmatic register. In order to be politically viable, climate
change migration must be dealt with transparently and through comprehensive ground-up
regional approaches that are tailored for particular regions, with careful attention paid to
each nation’s ability to fund and support safe resettlement. Lastly, in order to sell a
pragmatic solution, we need to think in terms of framing. A specific narrative framework
that presents this movement in response to climate change as disaster displacement is
necessary, and migrant resettlement should be diplomatically and tactfully constructed as
a form of disaster relief.
In many cases, ecological crises are observable, and exacerbation of
environmental catastrophes is predictable. It’s only a matter of time before many
locations become unlivable. Since these events are to a degree, foreseeable, it’s possible
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to establish contingency plans for what to do when the people are forced to leave. For
example, the process of desertification is usually gradual; it allows quite a bit of time for
experts to calculate the potential numbers of people that are forced to move and for
neighboring states to decide how many of these people they are able to resettle and for
what duration. As noted above, coffee growing communities in Central America are
deeply affected by climate change and there is a clear link between rising temperatures in
the area and lower coffee yield, whether it’s due to easier spreading of agricultural
diseases, or more intense and longer droughts. Migration as a result of this phenomenon
is predictable and observable through modern technology and data analysis. However,
it’s not being tracked in any kind of systematic way; countries are not sharing this
information and analyzing it together as a matter of regional security. I will discuss below
the importance of collaborative research and data gathering in greater depth. People
living in these coffee-dependent communities are left with little choice but to move
elsewhere and many migrate transnationally in the total absence of any policy or
institutional support.
The United Nations and other international bodies known for their data collection
like the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the South Centre must conjoin research efforts and share data
accordingly to best inform those governments involved in establishing regional
contingency plans for climate disaster relief. In a world of satellite imagery, artificial
intelligence, and endless amounts of information at the fingertips of billions, an
unexpected disaster should be extremely rare. Satellite imagery is already being used by
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academics to track the movements of migrants by measuring the intensity and location of
nighttime lights (Niedomysl et al., 2017, pp. 591-605). Additionally, organizations like
the IDMC are beginning to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to be able to
monitor where people are moving within nations (Lynch, 2019, p. 15).
The reality revealed from this data must be recognized within regional agreements
and mechanisms must be clearly established to adequately and smoothly resettle those
forced from their land with clear pathways to permanent residency, given the irreversible
nature of some effects of a rapidly changing planet. Regional frameworks built around
current patterns of human movement are necessary to ensure safe and healthy migration.
In Olopa, Guatemala, nearly half the residents have fled to the United States after the
coffee growing community suffered heavy losses directly related to rising temperatures
(Kahn, 2014). The surrounding countries have the information to create a regional
agreement to prepare for those displaced from Olopa. The governments of The United
States, Honduras, and Mexico to name a few neighbors, should establish a contingency
plan with the government of Guatemala, informed by accurate data and input from the
local communities to ensure the safe and necessarily permanent resettlement of those
displaced. There is a glaring need for carefully tailored and preemptive solutions to
potential problems associated with “unexpected” numbers of people crossing borders,
considering the complex differences amongst regions, and since climate change does not
affect nation-states homogeneously.
With a goal of regional resilience and the avoidance of human rights catastrophes,
new migration governance is necessary in the form of contingency planning. A modern
relevant example of a functional regionally focused framework to address displaced
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people is known as MIRPS, or the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions
Framework. This framework, born from the 2017 San Pedro Sula Declaration, is
designed primarily to address forced displacement and facilitate the protection of
refugees in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and more
recently El Salvador (p. 6). Despite the fact that this framework is intended to assist
refugees fleeing human persecution, and is careful to exclude those displaced from
climate change, it still remains an incredibly valuable model to use in constructing a
framework for the protection of climate migrants, since those displaced from human
persecution often experience similar vulnerabilities as those displaced from climate
change.
As mentioned in the beginning, the relationship between climate change and
migration is complex, and people are driven from their homes for many interrelated
reasons. Sudden-onset disasters like hurricanes, floods, etc. require neighboring countries
to be prepared for the increasing frequency of sudden ecologically destructive events
(IPCC, 2018, p. 4). Offices on the ground of neighboring countries should be able to
assess these events and determine when protection should be offered. Such protections
would not need to be ongoing; rather, offices coordinating climate-related migration
processing could respond to both acute and slow-building situations of forced migration
in an ad hoc way if they were provided with appropriate discretion.
The United States’ Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is an example of an ad hoc
application of certain legal protections. This mechanism even recognizes environmental
disasters as qualifying for the status “such as an earthquake, hurricane, or epidemic, that
results in a substantial but temporary disruption of living conditions, and because of
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which the foreign state is temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its
nationals” (American Immigration Council, 2018, p. 1). The problem with TPS is that it’s
more reactionary and is effectively a temporary promise not to deport people. Legal
frameworks must provide a permanent plan for those who are unable to return to their
places of origin. Benoit Mayer (2011) points out the fact that migrants who are accepted
on a temporary basis are more likely to be admitted into a country only when the country
can take advantage of them, and therefore, he advocates for climate-related migration to
be seen as permanent in nature and to allow for full naturalization and citizenship status
to protect against exploitation (pp. 390-391). However, TPS grants people the ability to
obtain work permits and allows for other privileges that one may not have had access to
before. Although this sense of temporary protection is not ideal, it is the seed for
something far greater.
Ideally, a temporary protective status would be more active in providing
protection and assistance to somebody beyond a promise not to deport people on an
indefinite but temporary basis. In the event of a sudden disaster like a hurricane or a more
slow-onset disaster such as a disease like coffee leaf rust threatening communities’
livelihoods, a surrounding coalition of nation states should have in place a plan to offer
protections such as emergency housing and other direct assistance to those who have lost
everything. Contingency plans for unexpected natural disasters, which are understood to
be exacerbated by climate change, must be well established around the world in order to
prevent any type of additional burden to victims of natural disasters.
People employed through the agriculture industry are among some of the most
vulnerable because of the rapidly worsening effects of climate change. Thousands of
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people in coffee producing areas remain the poorest and most sensitive to market and
climate shocks (Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2005, p. 1). As described above, the coffee
farming communities of Central America are in need of particular consideration in order
to protect those who cannot sustain their livelihoods as a result of climate change.
Realistically, a disaster relief plan for Central American coffee farming communities
must be expertly led, data driven and rooted in collaborative collective action. Temporary
protections need to be offered to address the imminent threat to safety and security, and
pathways to permanent citizenship must exist.
In 2019, between Central and North America, what is known as the largest
migration corridor in the world, over 60 million people were classified as migrants
according to the UN (United Nations, 2019). Yet, under the current system, it’s nearly
impossible to find how many of these people could be considered environmentally
displaced. Accuracy is key in policy formation. Therefore, painting an accurate picture of
where those Central American coffee farming communities are, and how they have been
impacted by climate change is the starting point for writing an adequate relief plan.
National and regionally specific data regarding internal displacement from the experts at
the IDMC, and transnational migration monitored by those at the IOM is available and
continuously being monitored. Research from these organizations, beyond keeping
numbers, gives expert insight into why migration is happening and where people who
migrate go. Looking more closely at this kind of data in tandem with satellite imagery,
the phenomenon of Central American coffee-growing communities migrating because of
climate change can be better understood and more adequately addressed.
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As data is analyzed, collective action must be taken in the efforts to resettle and
protect the rights of those who are displaced from climate change. Cooperation is
necessary on an international and national level, as well as amongst civil society,
including the public and private sectors. Regionally, in recognizing the general trend of
movement from Central America to North America, the governments of The United
States, Mexico, and Canada must work with those of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador
under the close guidance of experts to discover what populations involved in the coffee
growing process are displaced from climate change. Together, these countries should be
able to understand specifically the needs of people from coffee farming communities and
coordinate adequate humanitarian responses. For example if, like in Honduras in 2011,
coffee leaf rust ravages the farms and transforms the lives of thousands of people
involved in the production process, neighboring governments (local and national) as well
as the multiple organizations and institutions involved must be able to ensure primarily
the immediate safety of those affected as well as provide them with a pathway to
reestablish long term self-reliance, even if that means citizenship in another state.
As expressed, regional contingency plans to protect those displaced from
environmental disasters linked to climate change must be supported by these international
bodies in the form of money but also in the form of research. This isn’t to say the United
Nations should fully fund a regional contingency plan for displaced people’s
resettlement, but for those cases of necessity in which no surrounding nation has the
means, emergency funds should be accessible. This would be in line with the
aforementioned principle of subsidiarity. As we imagine a functional system of migration
governance that would result in orderly and safe movement of people once their
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environments become unlivable, it’s necessary to explore the ways in which this system
would manifest itself in the modern political context.

Displacement as disaster: the importance of framing
In the 21st century, it would be an understatement to say that migration has been
an increasingly politically polarizing subject. From “caravans” of people gathered like an
army “invading” the United States to harrowing images of distressed children crawling
off of boats after escaping the Syrian Civil War, migration and how to address it are very
popular topics of conversation. There is certainly an observable hierarchy of who
deserves to be in the United States in political discourse, as the diversification of
migration streams in the 21st century was met with a xenophobic backlash. Such antiimmigrant trends within the political context can help explain why protections for, and
even acknowledgement of, climate migrants is lacking.
The current binary structure of U.S. immigration law classifies all who arrive at
the border without authorization as either labor migrants, who have no claims to stay in
the U.S., or as asylum seekers, who may have a right to reside here if they can prove they
are refugees. A family whose coffee farm was destroyed by rising temperatures and CLR
that has decided to leave in hopes to survive will not qualify for asylum, but they may not
be accurately identified with the concept of “labor migrant”-- as someone who is simply
choosing to move in order to find a new job and a better life. In light of antiquated U.S.
immigration laws, climate migrants have a better chance of protection if the protective
actions were motivated by a desire to provide humanitarian disaster relief, at least until
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immigration law catches up with the aforementioned realities and seeking asylum on the
grounds of environmental threats is normalized.
Framing is a powerful tool in advocacy, and an integral piece of the puzzle if we
wish to change the way that displaced people are treated around the world. Framing
involves the use of specific language and narratives to create an image to represent
something. Caution must be used when constructing an image of a climate migrant
because oftentimes, framing becomes reality as we simplify knowledge for the purpose of
dissemination. Benford and Snow call framing, when used as a verb, an “active,
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality
construction” (p. 614). This is because framing is actually an active and fluid act of
creating a picture for a purpose. It is a constantly evolving process which requires human
effort to drive its evolution. They also note that framing is contentious because as the
frames evolve, they are regularly deployed to challenge or dispute alternate frames within
a political context (614). The intense politicization of migration in the 21st century can
help to explain why addressing the needs of those displaced from climate change as
refugees is highly contested.
Considering the political sensitivities associated with migration, it would be most
effective and accurate to frame the response to climate migration as disaster relief. When
constructing an image of a climate migrant, it’s important to ensure that those displaced
from climate change are conceptually distinct from labor migrants or traditional refugees
and thus have different needs in order to find safety. Both slow-onset and sudden effects
from climate change are typically characterized as disasters, and resettlement in the name
of disaster relief is important to avoid the potential political roadblocks that would likely
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emerge if one were to advocate for expanding the definition of refugees to encompass
those displaced from climate change. Disaster-relief framing would be sufficient in
establishing a sense that migrants displaced by climate change are deserving of
protection. We need not attempt to expand the definition of refugee, since the goal is to
establish systematic and lasting protections for climate migrants.
Despite the importance of presenting advocacy in terms that work with the current
field of political possibility, it’s important to note that political viability changes over
time. Twenty years ago, it would have been much more difficult to convince the world of
the need to devote time and resources to resettle those impacted by climate change.
However, as science revealed the painful reality for many affected by climate change and
the world began to listen, governments and almost every corner of civil society began to
take a vested interest in how the actions of people affect the planet. A clear example of
the shifting viability of particular policy proposals would be criminal justice reform in the
United States. Jody Armour explains the bipartisan transformation in the political
popularity of being tough on crime. He recounts that “A few years ago, the idea that
being tough on crime would be a liability – not an asset – was unthinkable for both
Democrats and Republicans.” (Armour, 2019, p. 1). Armour attributes the success in the
criminal justice reformers to the power of activists and writers reframing mass
incarceration as a civil rights crisis, intertwined with race, poverty and government
policy.
An important part of this re-framing of criminal justice policy was the data and
evidence emerging from research, which exposed the negative consequences of the
system created by the “tough on crime” policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s. The director of
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the National Institute for Justice, Nancy Rodriguez (2019), published a paper on the value
of scientific research in creating a better criminal justice system. She highlights the
importance of policy leaning on research and emphasizes the role of both social and
physical sciences working together to inform policy for criminal justice reform on many
levels (pp. 292-293). The act of publicizing data and exposing the empirical reality of
how policies (or lack of policies) affect real people in a technical and scientific way is a
valuable method that should be used in framing climate migrant resettlement as disaster
relief.
In efforts to construct policy around human displacement, disaster and risk
framing are incredibly powerful. In a study by Pranathi Diwakar (2019), she illustrates
how the government of Chennai, India was wildly successful in moving its urban slums
to the outskirts of the city as a result of framing residents in the slums as being acutely
vulnerable to natural disasters (pp. 1314-1315). Leaning on data and research to drive
decisions proved to be effective in inspiring criminal justice reform in the U.S. and the
use of disaster relief framing was successful in garnering support for slum relocation
policies in Chennai, India. In terms of framing, it is likely that combining a disaster relief
approach with expert-driven research and data will be successful in attracting support for
a new framework for climate migrants. Well-informed advocacy and careful framing is
necessary to accurately represent climate migration and thus inspire policy makers to take
expeditious action to protect the human rights of climate migrants.
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Conclusion
As our society transforms, and more devastating phenomena that lead to irregular
migration are exposed, like the struggles of producing coffee in land where temperatures
are rising and droughts are becoming more intense, the following question is critical.
What can we do as scholars/policy actors to “nudge” the world towards the ideal, while
recognizing the need to modify ideals in the short and medium term for pragmatic ends?
In this essay, I have pointed out the inadequacies of the current international
frameworks in protecting victims of forced migrations attributed to climate change and
have advocated for an updated framework rooted in principles of human rights and
regional subsidiarity. This framework’s regional character allows for policies to be
flexible and sensitive to local complexities and varying vulnerabilities. Of course, since
adverse effects of climate change are felt around the world, there is a critical need for
global support and coordination, whether it’s in the form of sharing data, research, and
best practices, or institutional advising.
As we imagine a world where human rights are respected in every step of the
migration process, whether the migration is considered forced or voluntary, advocacy and
narrative framing plays a critical role in executing the nudge towards the ideal. Activism
around climate change is already bold and abundant, but climate migrants must not be
left out of this discourse. The message must put the human person at the center. Scenarios
driving people from their homes vary immensely. However, whether classified as IDP,
asylum seeker, labor migrant, or refugee, there is one thing we all share, and that is
humanity.
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